The judgment of the High Court in Baxter v Doble & Anor [2023] EWHC 486 (KB) highlights the need for caution among those operating certain business models engaged in providing legal services, to ensure they avoid conducting litigation if not legally entitled to do so (an offence punishable by up to two years in prison and/or a fine).
The case concerned an application to commit the respondent company, and its CILEX-graduate director and sole shareholder, for contempt of court.
The respondents had provided legal services to a landlord seeking a possession order for a residential property, under s.8 and s.21 of the Housing Act 1988. The claim for possession was ultimately successful. The tenant seemingly made the application in the course of the underlying proceedings.
The case is relevant to the public policy issues of maintaining the proper administration of justice, and public access to legal services to the extent that this is a function of the breadth of the class of persons able to carry out “reserved legal activities”. The Law Society, the Legal Ombudsman, and CILEX Regulation Limited, an Approved Regulator for the purposes of the Legal Services Act 2007 (“the Act”), were invited to make representations to the court. Each did so. The judgment also examined the authorities on the meaning of “the conduct of litigation” for the purposes of s.12(1)(b) of the Act, and as defined in Schedule 2 thereof. None of the authorities were on all fours with the present case, and some predated the Act.
Various principles were outlined for determining what does and does not amount to the conduct of litigation:
The court made its decision in accordance with those principles – which included looking at the entirety of the activities undertaken. However, it was held that some of the activities by the respondents each, when looked at in isolation, consisted of the conduct of litigation. The list of such activities appears to include all of the following:
It has been held in other cases that serving a claim form and particulars of claim amounted to the conduct of litigation.
The court held that the definition of “the conduct of litigation” in the Act is wider than that set out in the statute which preceded it, because it now includes the commencement, prosecution and defence of proceedings before a court. “The conduct of litigation” is not restricted to the formal steps required.
However, the giving of legal advice in itself does not amount to the conduct of litigation. This applies even if the legal advice is about the procedures that need to be followed in the proceedings.
Certain facts did not affect whether the activity in question amounted to the conduct of litigation:
It was held that if these factors were determinative of whether the activity amounted to the conduct of litigation, it would provide an incentive for those who were not authorised persons to conceal their involvement from the court.
In addition:
The court held that the respondents had conducted litigation, but were not guilty of contempt of court. They had a valid defence under s.14(2) of the Act because they did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that they were acting in contempt of court and were committing an offence contrary to s.14(1) of the Act. This was in part because of the steps they had taken to try to verify they were not conducting litigation (which meant they genuinely believed that they were not), and in part because the statute and case law on the area was unclear.
Following the judgment, the law is now clearer, and it will be difficult in future to successfully rely on the ambiguity of the law as part of a defence.
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