Deterrence in Youth Sentencing

Deterrence remains a permissible consideration when sentencing children in England and Wales but it must be considered within a framework that requires attention to the child’s welfare, maturity and individual circumstances.

In R v Martin [2025] EWCA Crim 494, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that position. The decision supports a balanced approach; it does not establish a fixed hierarchy in which deterrence must invariably give way to other considerations.

The statutory framework

For adults, section 57(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 2020 expressly identifies the reduction of crime, including through deterrence, as a purpose of sentencing.

There is no equivalent statutory list for children. Instead, section 58 preserves existing duties: to have regard to the principal aim of the youth justice system under section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and to the child’s welfare under section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. The principal aim is to prevent offending by children and young persons.

Section 58 therefore preserves duties rather than creating a comprehensive statement of sentencing purposes. The absence of an express reference to deterrence does not itself amount to a prohibition. 

What Martin decided

Martin was 17 when he committed offences of possessing an offensive weapon in public and violent disorder. The incident involved knives and resulted in a death, but the manslaughter charge against him did not survive a no-case submission. His circumstances included ADHD, immaturity, homelessness and a finding of criminal exploitation.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that insufficient weight had been given to youth, mitigation and the proposed alternative to custody. It refused leave to appeal against the total 22-month detention and training order. 

On deterrence, the court cited R v Smickele [2012] EWCA Crim 1470, which recognised its permissible role in youth sentencing. The court stated that “appropriate focus and balance” were necessary, having regard to the youth sentencing guideline.

The significance of the guideline changes

The original 2017 guideline expressly recognised deterrence as a possible factor, normally restricted to serious offences and often outweighed by welfare considerations. That passage was removed in December 2020.

The deletion is relevant context but should not be treated as an express prohibition. The current guidance continues to emphasise welfare, rehabilitation and an individualised assessment. 

Individualised sentencing remains essential

The Sentencing Council’s guideline requires an individualistic approach focused on the child. Although offence seriousness is the starting point, rehabilitation should be the focus where possible. Assessing culpability requires attention to matters such as planning, the child’s role, the force used and their understanding of possible consequences.

These requirements matter when a court considers deterrence. A general concern about an offence cannot replace the assessment of the particular child and the proportionality of the proposed sentence. Relevant guidelines must be followed unless doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice. Deterrence still has a place. 

Children’s rights and the evidence on deterrence

Legal permissibility does not settle whether deterrent sentencing is desirable or effective.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child emphasises that responses to offending must account for the child’s personal circumstances and lesser culpability. The child’s best interests are a primary consideration, alongside the need to promote reintegration. The Committee also recognises public safety and proportionate sanctions in serious cases. 

Research also gives reasons for caution. The Sentencing Council’s commissioned 2022 evidence review identified difficulties with specific deterrence for young people and evidence that harsher punishment may increase offending. Its 2024 review found no robust general evidence that greater sentence severity produces greater marginal deterrence. Those findings challenge assumptions about the benefits of harsher sentences, without establishing that every form of deterrence is ineffective. 

Conclusion

Martin confirms that deterrence remains available within youth sentencing. Its weight must be assessed in the individual case, with appropriate attention to the child-focused framework. The decision neither prohibits deterrence nor gives it priority over welfare, maturity and rehabilitation.

Jaime Hamilton KC was instructed on behalf of the Crown in both the original trial (leading Robert Smith) and in the Court of Appeal.